On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games (Q2640470): Difference between revisions
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scientific article
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games |
scientific article |
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On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games (English)
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1991
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We show that any feasible, individually rational payoffs of an infinitely repeated game can arise as subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs if the discount factor is close enough to one even if mixed strategies are not observable and public randomizations are not available.
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folk theorem
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subgame perfect equilibrium
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public randomizations
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