A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure (Q1597936): Difference between revisions
From MaRDI portal
Removed claims |
Changed an Item |
||
| Property / author | |||
| Property / author: Ahmet U. Alkan / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
| Property / reviewed by | |||
| Property / reviewed by: Anton Stefanescu / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Revision as of 12:27, 11 February 2024
scientific article
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure |
scientific article |
Statements
A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure (English)
0 references
4 June 2002
0 references
It is proved that the set of stable matchings in a two-sided matching market is a distributive lattice under the common preferences of all agents on any one side of the market. The main conditions assumed are the path-independence and a new property called ``cardinal-monotonicity''.
0 references
stable matchings
0 references
choice function
0 references
lattice
0 references
