Social compromise and social metrics (Q1083992): Difference between revisions
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Revision as of 05:39, 13 February 2024
scientific article
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Social compromise and social metrics |
scientific article |
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Social compromise and social metrics (English)
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1986
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In the context of constitutional design, a committee of citizens' representatives proposes (social choice) axioms. The outcome should not necessarily be the aggregation rule, or rules, satisfying each of the axioms. Alternative procedures are recommended for aggregating a set of axioms into a single summary axiom. The summary axiom generates a single social decision function when a social metric is applied.
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constitutional design
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summary axiom
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social metric
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