Characterizing the Nash bargaining solution without Pareto-optimality (Q1117150): Difference between revisions
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Revision as of 03:15, 5 March 2024
scientific article
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Characterizing the Nash bargaining solution without Pareto-optimality |
scientific article |
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Characterizing the Nash bargaining solution without Pareto-optimality (English)
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1988
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We consider the bargaining problem with a variable number of agents. The first author [J. Econ. Theory 45, No.2, 330-341 (1988; Zbl 0657.90106)] had previously characterized the Nash solution as the only solution to satisfy the following axioms: Pareto Optimality, Symmetry, Scale Invariance, and Multilateral Stability. We show that the disagreement solution is the only additional solution to satisfy the restricted list of axioms obtained by dropping Pareto Optimality.
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axiomatic characterization
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bargaining
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variable number of agents
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Nash solution
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disagreement solution
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Pareto Optimality
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