A characterization of social choice correspondences that implement the core of simple games (Q957863): Difference between revisions
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Revision as of 20:19, 19 March 2024
scientific article
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | A characterization of social choice correspondences that implement the core of simple games |
scientific article |
Statements
A characterization of social choice correspondences that implement the core of simple games (English)
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1 December 2008
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The authors consider voting games satisfying Nakamura's inequality (Nakamura's number is greater than the number of alternatives; the core of such games is non-empty). Their objective is to find conditions on social choice correspondences such that the set of selected alternatives for any profile coincides with the core of some voting game. They show that such conditions are weak Pareto property, Maskin monotonicity, weak neutrality and weak decisiveness (when individual preferences are weak orderings).
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voting games
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implementation
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core
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