A Markovian mechanism of proportional resource allocation in the incentive model as a dynamic stochastic inverse Stackelberg game (Q1634389): Difference between revisions
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Revision as of 21:39, 19 March 2024
scientific article
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| English | A Markovian mechanism of proportional resource allocation in the incentive model as a dynamic stochastic inverse Stackelberg game |
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A Markovian mechanism of proportional resource allocation in the incentive model as a dynamic stochastic inverse Stackelberg game (English)
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18 December 2018
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Summary: This paper considers resource allocation among producers (agents) in the case where the principal knows nothing about their cost functions while the agents have Markovian awareness about his/her strategies. We use a dynamic setup of the stochastic inverse Stackelberg game as the model. We suggest an algorithm for solving this game based on \(Q\)-learning. The associated Bellman equations contain functions of one variable for the principal and also for the agents. The new results are illustrated by numerical examples.
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dynamic inverse Stackelberg game
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incentives
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online learning
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resource allocation
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