Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain (Q2386134): Difference between revisions
From MaRDI portal
Set profile property. |
Set OpenAlex properties. |
||
Property / full work available at URL | |||
Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.05.004 / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / OpenAlex ID | |||
Property / OpenAlex ID: W1994569768 / rank | |||
Normal rank |
Revision as of 00:54, 20 March 2024
scientific article
Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
---|---|---|---|
English | Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain |
scientific article |
Statements
Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain (English)
0 references
22 August 2005
0 references
A set of indivisible objects should be allocated between agents, and every agent should receive at most one object. Such an assignment problem is considered using a full preference domain where preferences are private, and the assumption of linear preferences is given up. It is shown that in this situation equity can not be implemented by an exchange based market mechanism. Serially Dictatorial Rules, however, always give a strongly efficient solution making it possible to restore equity by means of randomization. Main results are obtained from comparison of two classes of mechanisms: (i) Bi-polar Serially Dictatorial Rules by Essential Single-Valuedness, Pareto Indifference, Strategy-Proofness Weak Non-Bossiness; and (ii) all selections from Bi-polar Serially Dictatorial Rules by Single-Valuedness, Efficiency, Strategy-Proofness and Weak Non-Bossiness.
0 references
assignment
0 references
indivisible
0 references
serially dictatorial
0 references
strategy-proofness
0 references