Dismissals and quits in repeated games (Q2268132): Difference between revisions
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Revision as of 01:07, 20 March 2024
scientific article
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English | Dismissals and quits in repeated games |
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Dismissals and quits in repeated games (English)
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10 March 2010
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Consider a finitely repeated, 2-player game G. Suppose player 1 can decide whether player 2 continues, or is replaced by another player. This threat to terminate creates a good equilibrium/bad equilibrium structure, just as in the Benoi-Krishna theorem (1985), and leads to a subgame perfect equilibrium of G which has high efficiency. When player 2 can quit, then the previous result only holds when 2's outside option is low.
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finitely repeated game
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two players
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subgame perfection
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Benoit-Krishna theorem
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