Evolutionary learning in signalling games (Q5928235): Difference between revisions
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1582218
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English | Evolutionary learning in signalling games |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1582218 |
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Evolutionary learning in signalling games (English)
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6 July 2003
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The authors study equilibrium selection by evolutionary learning in monotone two-type signalling games. The learning process they study extends that introduced by \textit{H. P. Young} [Econometrica 61, 57-84 (1993; Zbl 0773.90101)] to deal with incomplete information and sequential moves; it thus involves stochastic trembles. For vanishing trembles the process gives rise to strong selection among sequential equilibria; if the game has separating equilibria, then in the long run only play according to the Riley equilibrium frequently.
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equilibrium selection
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signalling games
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learning
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stochastic trembles
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