Farsighted coalitional stability (Q1332710): Difference between revisions
From MaRDI portal
Set profile property. |
Set OpenAlex properties. |
||
Property / full work available at URL | |||
Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1044 / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / OpenAlex ID | |||
Property / OpenAlex ID: W1581606349 / rank | |||
Normal rank |
Latest revision as of 02:37, 20 March 2024
scientific article
Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
---|---|---|---|
English | Farsighted coalitional stability |
scientific article |
Statements
Farsighted coalitional stability (English)
0 references
29 July 1996
0 references
The authors define the largest consistent set, a solution concept which applies to situations in which coalitions freely form but cannot make binding contracts, act publicly, and are fully ``farsighted'' in that a coalition considers the possibility that, once it acts, another coalition might react, a third coalition might in turn react, and so on, without limit. They establish weak nonemptiness conditions and apply it to strategic and coalitional form games and majority rule voting. They argue that it improves on the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set as it is usually defined but is consistent with a generalization of the stable set as in the theory of social situations.
0 references
coalitional stability
0 references
largest consistent set
0 references
solution concept
0 references
weak nonemptiness conditions
0 references
coalitional form games
0 references
majority rule voting
0 references