Implementing action profiles when agents collude (Q1357585): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / cites work @@
+Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q3254691
@@ Property / cites work: Q3254691 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
@@ Property / cites work: Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Renegotiation in repeated games
@@ Property / cites work: Renegotiation in repeated games / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Coalitions, incentives, and risk sharing
@@ Property / cites work: Coalitions, incentives, and risk sharing / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Far-sighted strong equilibrium and oligopoly
@@ Property / cites work: Far-sighted strong equilibrium and oligopoly / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Stopping agents from ``cheating''
@@ Property / cites work: Stopping agents from ``cheating'' / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q3901249
@@ Property / cites work: Q3901249 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
@@ Property / cites work: Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
@@ Property / cites work: Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
+Normal rank