Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings (Q1566906): Difference between revisions
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Property / cites work: Some remarks on the stable matching problem / rank | |||
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Latest revision as of 16:36, 29 May 2024
scientific article
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English | Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings |
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Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings (English)
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4 March 2001
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many-to-one stable matchings
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responsive preference
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substitutable preferences
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\(q\)-separability
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