On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings (Q1583164): Difference between revisions
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| Property / cites work: Marriage and Class / rank | |||
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| Property / cites work: On the existence of stable roommate matchings / rank | |||
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| Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank | |||
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| Property / cites work: Q3995616 / rank | |||
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Latest revision as of 16:52, 30 May 2024
scientific article
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings |
scientific article |
Statements
On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings (English)
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26 October 2000
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A sufficient condition for uniqueness is identified on the preferences in the marriage problem, i.e. two-sided one-to-one matching with non transferable utility. For small economies this condition is also necessary. This class of preferences is broad and they are of particular relevance in economic applications.
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marriage problem
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matching
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uniqueness
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