On the irrelevance of risk attitudes in repeated two-outcome games (Q5931930): Difference between revisions
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Latest revision as of 16:50, 3 June 2024
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1594697
Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
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English | On the irrelevance of risk attitudes in repeated two-outcome games |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1594697 |
Statements
On the irrelevance of risk attitudes in repeated two-outcome games (English)
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6 May 2001
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In a win-loss game each player has two outcomes (``win'' and ``loss''). A two-person win-loss game is strictly competitive if for every pure strategy one player wins and the other losses. The main result of the paper shows that every Nash equilibrium of a two-person, strictly competitive repeated game with finitely many stages is formed by Nash equilibria of a stage games. The only condition required for the utility function of a player is that whenever two sequences of outcomes differ only at a single stage, it assigns a higher value to those where the player wins.
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repeated games
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Nash equilibrium
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