The core of large differentiable TU games (Q5958893): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 22:58, 3 June 2024

scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1721775
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English
The core of large differentiable TU games
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1721775

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    The core of large differentiable TU games (English)
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    20 March 2002
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    The authors show that for non-atomic TU games under certain conditions, the core can be determined by computing appropriate derivatives of the characteristic function \(v\). The computations yield either the core of \(v\) is empty or it consists of a single measure. If the latter case happens, the core measure can be expressed explicitly in terms of the derivatives of \(v\). Then the core theory for a class of non-atomic TU games may be reduced to calculus.
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    nonatomic game core
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    exchange economy
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    large game
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