Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model (Q1599824): Difference between revisions

Starting from the scientific contribution of \textit{D. P. Baron} and \textit{J. A. Ferejohn} [Bargaining in legislatures, Am. Polit. Ital. Sci. Rev. 83, 1181--1206 (1989)] in this research paper the author extends the initial model of the above authors to some general agreements rules and allows the discount factors to different across the layers. Thus, the author's study is devoted to some multilateral, sequential and generalized models such as those, where the players have possible different probabilities to be selected as the proposers and the corresponding rate at which they discount the future payoffs. Consequently, whenever the players have a common discount factor, the equilibrium payoffs control functions are nondecreasing with respect to the recognition probabilities. Finally, the author proves the uniqueness of the stationary subgames ``perfect'' equilibria payoffs and indicates the references.