Welfare asymptotics of the pivotal mechanism for excludable public goods. (Q1867811): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 14:47, 5 June 2024

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Welfare asymptotics of the pivotal mechanism for excludable public goods.
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    Welfare asymptotics of the pivotal mechanism for excludable public goods. (English)
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    2 April 2003
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    The paper describes the pivotal mechanism when the public goods being considered is excludable. A general characterization of the pivotal mechanism for excludable public goods has been provided. For authors purpose, a closed form solution rather than a general characterization needed for welfare loss computations. To analyze the welfare loss from the mechanism when it is applied to an excludable public good, it is shown, that it is equivalent to the standard axiomatic description of the known mechanism. Different computational techniques are used to show that the welfare loss from pivotal mechanism in the case of an excludable public good converges to zero in a very strong sense.
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    public goods
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    pivotal mechanism
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    welfare loss
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