Stable schedule matching under revealed preference. (Q1414616): Difference between revisions

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+On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings
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+A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure
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+The Stable Allocation (or Ordinal Transportation) Problem
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+Competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy with indivisibilities
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+The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
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+Comparative statics in matching markets
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+A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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+Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes
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+Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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+Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice
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+Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
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+The College Admissions Problem Revisited
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+Q3999327
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+The assignment game. I: The core
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+Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
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