On constant Maskin monotonic social choice functions (Q1096516): Difference between revisions
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| Property / cites work: The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility / rank | |||
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| Property / cites work: Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality / rank | |||
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Latest revision as of 12:54, 18 June 2024
scientific article
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | On constant Maskin monotonic social choice functions |
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On constant Maskin monotonic social choice functions (English)
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1987
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A social choice function satisfying a ``dual dominance'' condition is Maskin monotonic if and only if it is constant. Hence, any non-constant social choice function satisfying dual dominance is not Nash implementable. Among the important examples are all social choice functions on unrestricted domains. On the other hand, non-constant social choice functions such as a Walrasian performance function in economic environments need not satisfy dual dominance.
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Maskin monotonic
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Nash implementable
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unrestricted domains
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dual dominance
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