The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms (Q1121150): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 15:31, 19 June 2024

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The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms
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    The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms (English)
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    1989
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    Private information
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    independent, private-values market
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    trading mechanisms
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    ex post efficient allocations
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