An ascending double auction (Q946361): Difference between revisions

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Revision as of 16:33, 28 June 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
An ascending double auction
scientific article

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    An ascending double auction (English)
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    23 September 2008
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    The paper under review shows why the failure of the affiliation assumption prevents the double auction from achieving efficient outcomes when values are interdependent.
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    double auction
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    rational expectations
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    extensive form games
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    Bayesian games
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