Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts (Q1036602): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 04:41, 2 July 2024

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Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
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    Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts (English)
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    13 November 2009
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    matching
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    matching with contracts
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    substitutes
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    law of aggregate demand
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    stability
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    strategy-proofness
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    group strategy-proofness
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