First-price equilibrium and revenue equivalence in a sequential procurement auction model (Q2268137): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 13:37, 2 July 2024

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First-price equilibrium and revenue equivalence in a sequential procurement auction model
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    First-price equilibrium and revenue equivalence in a sequential procurement auction model (English)
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    10 March 2010
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    The authors introduce a sequential procurement auction model in order to analyze the first-price corresponding equilibrium, under capacity constraints and endogenous outside applications, with possible revenue equivalences.
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    auction model
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    price-equilibrium
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    revenue equivalence
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