The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the national resident matching program (NRMP) (Q972135): Difference between revisions

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+Q3066116
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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+Some remarks on the stable matching problem
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+The Complexity of Counting Stable Marriages
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+Implementation of college admission rules
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+Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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+Stable matchings and the small core in Nash equilibrium in the college admissions problem.
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+Q4902563
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+The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
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+Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
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+Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
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+The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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+The College Admissions Problem Revisited
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+Q3999327
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+Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
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+Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
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