Sealed bid auctions versus ascending bid auctions: an experimental study (Q1944865): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 08:25, 6 July 2024

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Sealed bid auctions versus ascending bid auctions: an experimental study
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    Sealed bid auctions versus ascending bid auctions: an experimental study (English)
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    28 March 2013
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    auctions
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    non-manipulability
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    efficiency
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    experiments
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