Pricing in position auctions and online advertising (Q2636854): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 08:20, 7 July 2024

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Pricing in position auctions and online advertising
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    Pricing in position auctions and online advertising (English)
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    18 February 2014
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    The paper studies whether online search engines can increase revenues by changing the commonly used auction format of second-price auction. The author proves that, if the pricing functions are regular, then there is an ex post equilibrium of the ascending auction that is ex post payoff equivalent to the celebrated VCG mechanism.
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    position auctions
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    online advertising
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    multidimensional types
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    ex post payoff equivalence
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