Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions (Q460636): Difference between revisions

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Property / cites work: Derandomization of auctions / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 04:28, 9 July 2024

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Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions
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    Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions (English)
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    13 October 2014
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    mechanism design
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    Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism
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    payment redistribution
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