Consistent beliefs in extensive form games (Q2344951): Difference between revisions

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Property / cites work: Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Consistency of beliefs and epistemic conditions for Nash and correlated equilibria / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 02:59, 10 July 2024

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Consistent beliefs in extensive form games
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    Consistent beliefs in extensive form games (English)
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    19 May 2015
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    Summary: We introduce consistency of beliefs in the space of hierarchies of conditional beliefs [\textit{P. Battigalli} and \textit{M. Siniscalchi}, J. Econ. Theory 88, No. 1, 188--230 (1999; Zbl 0972.91020)] and use it to provide epistemic conditions for equilibria in finite multi-stage games with observed actions.
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    hierarchies of conditional beliefs
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    epistemic conditions
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    common belief
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    correlated subgame perfect equilibrium
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