Non fixed-price trading rules in single-crossing classical exchange economies (Q2353698): Difference between revisions

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Non fixed-price trading rules in single-crossing classical exchange economies
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    Non fixed-price trading rules in single-crossing classical exchange economies (English)
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    16 July 2015
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