Leave and let leave: a sufficient condition to explain the evolutionary emergence of cooperation (Q1994622): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 05:33, 17 July 2024

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Leave and let leave: a sufficient condition to explain the evolutionary emergence of cooperation
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    Leave and let leave: a sufficient condition to explain the evolutionary emergence of cooperation (English)
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    1 November 2018
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    option to leave
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    conditional dissociation
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    prisoner's dilemma
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    positive assortment
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    exit option
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