Pages that link to "Item:Q1994622"

The following pages link to Leave and let leave: a sufficient condition to explain the evolutionary emergence of cooperation (Q1994622):

Displaying 18 items.

• Efficiency may improve when defectors exist (Q889254) (← links)
• Cooperation, punishment and immigration (Q893395) (← links)
• Moderate tolerance promotes tag-mediated cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game (Q1618315) (← links)
• Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance (Q1651914) (← links)
• The opportunity cost of walking away in the spatial iterated prisoner's dilemma (Q1999485) (← links)
• Cooperation evolves more when players keep the interaction with unknown players (Q2009251) (← links)
• Partner selection and emergence of the merit-based equity norm (Q2013424) (← links)
• Effect of the group size on the evolution of cooperation when an exit option is present (Q2029549) (← links)
• Matching markets and cultural selection (Q2070745) (← links)
• Evolution of trustfulness in the case where resources for cooperation are sometimes absent (Q2152688) (← links)
• Game theory and the evolution of cooperation (Q2158117) (← links)
• Labelling, homophily and preference evolution (Q2178634) (← links)
• Asymmetrical expectations of future interaction and cooperation in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game (Q2279415) (← links)
• Three-player repeated games with an opt-out option (Q2324874) (← links)
• A simple rule of direct reciprocity leads to the stable coexistence of cooperation and defection in the prisoner's dilemma game (Q2402502) (← links)
• The consequences of switching strategies in a two-player iterated survival game (Q2659039) (← links)
• Disbandment rule sways the evolution of tolerance (Q2662533) (← links)
• Social Hierarchy and the Evolution of Behavior (Q4602183) (← links)