Fairness and efficiency in cake-cutting with single-peaked preferences (Q2180735): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 16:31, 22 July 2024

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Fairness and efficiency in cake-cutting with single-peaked preferences
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    Fairness and efficiency in cake-cutting with single-peaked preferences (English)
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    14 May 2020
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    cake-cutting
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    fair division
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    single-peaked preferences
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