Undominated mechanisms and the provision of a pure public good in two agent economies (Q2068880): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / cites work @@
+A Solomonic solution to the problem of assigning a private indivisible good
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q3208356
@@ Property / cites work: Q3208356 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Incentives in Teams
@@ Property / cites work: Incentives in Teams / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Undominated Groves Mechanisms
@@ Property / cites work: Undominated Groves Mechanisms / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
@@ Property / cites work: Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q3993509
@@ Property / cites work: Q3993509 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q3524718
@@ Property / cites work: Q3524718 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: beyond the Groves mechanisms
+Normal rank