Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets (Q2078071): Difference between revisions

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Revision as of 03:03, 28 July 2024

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Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets
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    Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets (English)
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    25 February 2022
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    lattice structure
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    random stable matching markets
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    many-to-many matching markets
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