Equivalence theorem in matching with contracts (Q2128949): Difference between revisions

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+Efficiency and stability under substitutable priorities with ties
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+Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
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+Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
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+Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
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+On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts
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+The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness
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+Axioms for Deferred Acceptance
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+Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
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+A note on strategy-proofness from the doctor side in matching with contracts
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+Matching With (Branch-of-Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy
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+Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
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+Domains of social choice functions on which coalition strategy-proofness and maskin monotonicity are equivalent
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+Consistency and its converse: an introduction
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