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Latest revision as of 10:22, 30 July 2024
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English | Delaying or deterring entry. A game-theoretic analysis |
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Delaying or deterring entry. A game-theoretic analysis (English)
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1990
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Interaction amongst game entrants with a predation model, in which incomplete information about the new incubant gives an incentive to enter after others in order to observe what happens to them. The incumbent's payoff is O in a given market if he shares in that market, and \(\alpha\) (t) each instant forever after, or (\(\alpha\) (t)/r) if he preys that market. If the dates of entry are \(d_ i\) for player i, payoff is then: \((1/r)(1-\exp (-rd_ i))c\). The model leads to endogeneous delayed entry, rather than entry deterrence only.
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incomplete information
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endogeneous delayed entry
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