Undominated strategies and coordination in normalform games (Q2641200): Difference between revisions
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Latest revision as of 10:26, 30 July 2024
scientific article
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English | Undominated strategies and coordination in normalform games |
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Undominated strategies and coordination in normalform games (English)
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1991
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This paper studies procedures for collective decision making that ensure that collective decisions are Pareto-efficient provided that all agents choose strategies that are not weakly dominated. We first show that such procedures always exist. We then introduce the notion of a ``compromise'', and investigate whether, within the considered class of procedures, there are procedures which do not exclude compromises. We show, using some additional assumptions, that the answer is positive. Finally, we ask whether within the considered class of procedures there are procedures which automatically guide agents to compromises. We show, again using some additional assumptions, that the answer to this question is negative.
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collective decision making
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Pareto-efficient
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compromise
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