Evaluation and strategic manipulation (Q6100481): Difference between revisions

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+Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
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+Picking the winners
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+The scholarship assignment problem
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+Q2783476
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+Interested experts and policy advice: Multiple referrals under open rule
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+Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents
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+A Bayesian model of voting in juries
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+Aggregation of expert opinions
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+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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+A Model of Expertise
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+Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
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+Subgame Perfect Implementation
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+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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+Eliciting information from multiple experts
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+Selecting winners with partially honest jurors
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