A note on binary strategy-proof social choice functions (Q6105153): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
@@ Property / cites work: Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Group strategy-proofness and voting between two alternatives
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+A characterization of status quo rules in the binary social choice model
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q2859380
@@ Property / cites work: Q2859380 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Anonymous, non-manipulable binary social choice
@@ Property / cites work: Anonymous, non-manipulable binary social choice / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Binary strategy-proof social choice functions with indifference
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+A solution of Dedekind's problem on the number of isotone Boolean functions.
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q4126378
@@ Property / cites work: Q4126378 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+There are more strategy-proof procedures than you think
+Normal rank