Repeated communication with private lying costs (Q6166489): Difference between revisions

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Revision as of 15:04, 1 August 2024

scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7708179
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Repeated communication with private lying costs
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7708179

    Statements

    Repeated communication with private lying costs (English)
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    6 July 2023
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    repeated communication game
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    persistent private information
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    Bayesian persuasion
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    Identifiers