An algorithm for identifying least manipulable envy‐free and budget‐balanced allocations in economies with indivisibilities (Q6074887): Difference between revisions

Revision as of 05:54, 3 August 2024

scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7752423

Language	Label	Description	Also known as
English	An algorithm for identifying least manipulable envy‐free and budget‐balanced allocations in economies with indivisibilities	scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7752423

Statements

instance of

scholarly article

0 references

title

An algorithm for identifying least manipulable envy‐free and budget‐balanced allocations in economies with indivisibilities (English)

0 references

0 references

0 references

International Journal of Economic Theory

0 references

publication date

19 October 2023

0 references

zbMATH Keywords

algorithm

0 references

budget-balance

0 references

envy-freeness

0 references

least manipulable

0 references

MaRDI profile type

Publication

0 references

full work available at URL

https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12300

0 references

cites work

Room assignment-rent division: a market approach

0 references

Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice

0 references

Budget balance, fairness, and minimal manipulability

0 references

Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities

0 references

Sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions

0 references

A derivation of the money rawlsian solution

0 references

Fully Polynomial-Time Approximation Schemes for Fair Rent Division

0 references

Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money

0 references

Which Is the Fairest (Rent Division) of Them All?

0 references

Q3208356

0 references

Bidding for envy-freeness: a procedural approach to \(n\)-player fair-division problems

0 references

An algorithm for envy-free allocations in an economy with indivisible objects and money

0 references

Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity

0 references

Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability

0 references

Divide and compromise

0 references

Bidding in Simultaneous Auctions with a Constraint on Exposure

0 references

Rental Harmony: Sperner's Lemma in Fair Division

0 references

Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness

0 references

Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness

0 references

No-Envy and Consistency in Economies with Indivisible Goods

0 references

The fair allocation of an indivisible good when monetary compensations are possible

0 references

Refinements of the no-envy solution in economies with indivisible goods

0 references

Games of fair division

0 references

Are incentives against economic justice?

0 references

Identifiers

zbMATH Open document ID

1530.91240

0 references

DOI

10.1111/ijet.12300

0 references

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

0 references

0 references

0 references

0 references

Sitelinks

Mathematics(1 entry)

mardi Publication:6074887

@@ Property / cites work @@
+Room assignment-rent division: a market approach
@@ Property / cites work: Room assignment-rent division: a market approach / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Budget balance, fairness, and minimal manipulability
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+A derivation of the money rawlsian solution
@@ Property / cites work: A derivation of the money rawlsian solution / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Fully Polynomial-Time Approximation Schemes for Fair Rent Division
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Which Is the Fairest (Rent Division) of Them All?
@@ Property / cites work: Which Is the Fairest (Rent Division) of Them All? / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q3208356
@@ Property / cites work: Q3208356 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Bidding for envy-freeness: a procedural approach to \(n\)-player fair-division problems
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+An algorithm for envy-free allocations in an economy with indivisible objects and money
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity
@@ Property / cites work: Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability
@@ Property / cites work: Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Divide and compromise
@@ Property / cites work: Divide and compromise / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Bidding in Simultaneous Auctions with a Constraint on Exposure
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Rental Harmony: Sperner's Lemma in Fair Division
@@ Property / cites work: Rental Harmony: Sperner's Lemma in Fair Division / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness
@@ Property / cites work: Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+No-Envy and Consistency in Economies with Indivisible Goods
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The fair allocation of an indivisible good when monetary compensations are possible
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Refinements of the no-envy solution in economies with indivisible goods
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Games of fair division
@@ Property / cites work: Games of fair division / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Are incentives against economic justice?
@@ Property / cites work: Are incentives against economic justice? / rank @@
+Normal rank