Restricted complementarity and paths to stability in matching with couples (Q6125927): Difference between revisions

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+A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure
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+MATCHING WITH COUPLES: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY SURVEY
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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+Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
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+Stable matchings and preferences of couples
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+Paths to stability for matching markets with couples
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+Corrigendum to ``stable matchings and preferences of couples''
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+Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration
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+The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
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+Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
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+Matching with contracts, substitutes and two-unit demand
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