Pages that link to "Item:Q3748017"
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The following pages link to Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives (Q3748017):
Displaying 50 items.
- The principal-agent problem when the agent has access to outside markets (Q1319630) (← links)
- Optimal principal agent contracts for a class of incentive schemes: A characterization and the rate of approach to efficiency (Q1341508) (← links)
- Corporate insurance and managerial incentives (Q1367894) (← links)
- Pay-performance sensitivity and production uncertainty (Q1391618) (← links)
- The effectiveness of English auctions. (Q1399514) (← links)
- Asymptotic efficiency in dynamic principal-agent problems (Q1572946) (← links)
- Bargaining on behalf of a constituency (Q1581189) (← links)
- Empire building by corporate managers (Q1606188) (← links)
- Ambiguity sharing and the lack of relative performance evaluation (Q1616079) (← links)
- Moral hazard under ambiguity (Q1626505) (← links)
- A continuous-time optimal insurance design with costly monitoring (Q1627672) (← links)
- Optimal contracts under competition when uncertainty from adverse selection and moral hazard are present (Q1640935) (← links)
- Risk aversion in the Nash bargaining problem with uncertainty (Q1650925) (← links)
- Optimal incentives in a principal-agent model with endogenous technology (Q1651871) (← links)
- Moral hazard in innovation: the relationship between risk aversion and performance pay (Q1654085) (← links)
- Performance pay, trade and inequality (Q1676476) (← links)
- Unit-sphere games (Q1684124) (← links)
- Reward schemes (Q1691347) (← links)
- Dynamic programming approach to principal-agent problems (Q1691442) (← links)
- Asset pricing under optimal contracts (Q1693186) (← links)
- A principal-agent problem with heterogeneous demand distributions for a carbon capture and storage system (Q1694340) (← links)
- Mechanism design of fashion virtual enterprise under monitoring strategy (Q1718590) (← links)
- Uncertainty, risk, and the efficiencies of the principal and the agent: a chance constrained data envelopment analysis approach (Q1721524) (← links)
- An agency perspective for multi-mode project scheduling with time/cost trade-offs (Q1722976) (← links)
- A solvable dynamic principal-agent model with linear marginal productivity (Q1727153) (← links)
- A solvable time-inconsistent principal-agent problem (Q1727286) (← links)
- Goal setting in the principal-agent model: weak incentives for strong performance (Q1753293) (← links)
- Imperfect public monitoring with a fear of signal distortion (Q1753675) (← links)
- Incentive mechanism design aiming at deflated performance manipulation in retail firms: based on the ratchet effect and the reputation effect (Q1793302) (← links)
- Channel coordination in logistics service supply chain considering fairness (Q1793844) (← links)
- Impacts of risk attitude and outside option on compensation contracts under different information structures (Q1795028) (← links)
- Stable risk-sharing (Q1867779) (← links)
- On the complexity of repeated principal agent games (Q1906023) (← links)
- Linear incentive schemes and Poisson processes in economic agency models (Q1908039) (← links)
- Risk sharing vs. incentives: contract design under two-sided heterogeneity (Q1927911) (← links)
- Optimal team incentives with CES production (Q1929387) (← links)
- Optimal incentive contracts under relative income concerns (Q1932540) (← links)
- Can labor markets help resolve collusion? (Q1934067) (← links)
- Optimal contracting with effort and misvaluation (Q1938959) (← links)
- Pricing and allotment in a sea-cargo supply chain with reference effect: a dynamic game approach (Q1956001) (← links)
- Dynamic contracting under imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs (Q1994202) (← links)
- Simple contracts under observable and hidden actions (Q1996108) (← links)
- Team incentives with imperfect mutual inference (Q2002074) (← links)
- Wealth effects and agency costs (Q2016213) (← links)
- Optimal compensation and investment affected by firm size and time-varying external factors (Q2022926) (← links)
- Ambiguity in dynamic contracts (Q2067409) (← links)
- Optimal contracting under mean-volatility joint ambiguity uncertainties (Q2088616) (← links)
- Incentives, lockdown, and testing: from Thucydides' analysis to the COVID-19 pandemic (Q2133932) (← links)
- Contract design for afforestation programs (Q2152108) (← links)
- A continuous-time version of a delegated asset management problem (Q2217060) (← links)
