Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain (Q2386134)

A set of indivisible objects should be allocated between agents, and every agent should receive at most one object. Such an assignment problem is considered using a full preference domain where preferences are private, and the assumption of linear preferences is given up. It is shown that in this situation equity can not be implemented by an exchange based market mechanism. Serially Dictatorial Rules, however, always give a strongly efficient solution making it possible to restore equity by means of randomization. Main results are obtained from comparison of two classes of mechanisms: (i) Bi-polar Serially Dictatorial Rules by Essential Single-Valuedness, Pareto Indifference, Strategy-Proofness Weak Non-Bossiness; and (ii) all selections from Bi-polar Serially Dictatorial Rules by Single-Valuedness, Efficiency, Strategy-Proofness and Weak Non-Bossiness.