Cooperative and non-cooperative fiscal stabilization policies in the EMU.

DOI10.1016/S0165-1889(00)00056-7zbMath1056.91540WikidataQ57787299 ScholiaQ57787299MaRDI QIDQ5958595

Jacob Christiaan Engwerda, Bas van Aarle, Joseph E. J. Plasmans

Publication date: 3 March 2002

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74) Dynamic games (91A25)

Related Items (8)

DYNAMIC CONTROLLABILITY WITH OVERLAPPING TARGETS: OR WHY TARGET INDEPENDENCE MAY NOT BE GOOD FOR YOU ⋮ Fiscal and monetary policy interactions: a game theory approach ⋮ Developments in differential game theory and numerical methods: Economic and management applications ⋮ Stabilizability of Game-Based Control Systems ⋮ The open-loop linear quadratic differential game for index one descriptor systems ⋮ Staying together or breaking apart: policy-makers' endogenous coalitions formation in the European economic and monetary union ⋮ Interactions Between Fiscal and Monetary Authorities in a Three-Country New-Keynesian Model of a Monetary Union ⋮ Models of Endogenous Coalition Formation Between Fiscal and Monetary Authorities in the Presence of a Monetary Union

Cites Work

• Commitment and coordination in a dynamic game model of international economic policy-making
• The (in)finite horizon open-loop Nash LQ game: An application to EMU
• Unnamed Item

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