Preferences for contractual forms in supply chains
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Publication:299789
DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2014.07.047zbMath1338.90058OpenAlexW1974747901MaRDI QIDQ299789
Publication date: 23 June 2016
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2014.07.047
Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Applications of game theory (91A80) Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Group preferences (91B10)
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- Reverse supply chain coordination by revenue sharing contract: a case for the personal computers industry
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- Decentralized Supply Chains with Competing Retailers Under Demand Uncertainty
- Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations
- Coordinating Supply Chains with Simple Pricing Schemes: The Role of Vendor-Managed Inventories
- The Quantity Flexibility Contract and Supplier-Customer Incentives
- Competing Manufacturers in a Retail Supply Chain: On Contractual Form and Coordination
- Contracting and Information Sharing Under Supply Chain Competition
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