Runs, panics and bubbles: Diamond-Dybvig and Morris-Shin reconsidered

DOI10.1007/S10436-013-0231-8zbMath1335.91020OpenAlexW1964472176MaRDI QIDQ481383

Yong-Cai Geng, Sumit K. Garg

Publication date: 12 December 2014

Published in: Annals of Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10436-013-0231-8

zbMATH Keywords

sensitivity analysisreplicator dynamicsnoncooperative gamesevolutionary gamesdynamic investment model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Games in extensive form (91A18) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Evolutionary games (91A22) Actuarial science and mathematical finance (91G99)

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• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions
• The Logic of Animal Conflict

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