Mixed equilibria in runoff elections

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.09.002zbMath1302.91072OpenAlexW2061520547MaRDI QIDQ485818

Dimitrios Xefteris

Publication date: 14 January 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.09.002

zbMATH Keywords

mixed strategiesHotelling-Downsrunoff voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (3)

Mixed equilibrium in a pure location game: the case of \(n\geq 4\) firms ⋮ Hotelling-Downs equilibria: moving beyond plurality variants ⋮ Stability in electoral competition: a case for multiple votes

Cites Work

• Symmetric games with only asymmetric equilibria
• The Hotelling-Downs model with runoff voting
• Candidate positioning and entry in a political competition
• The Nature of Equilibrium in a Location Model

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