Identification in first-price and Dutch auctions when the number of potential bidders is unobservable
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Publication:550201
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.10.011zbMath1217.91080MaRDI QIDQ550201
Adam Chi Leung Wong, Artyom A. Shneyerov
Publication date: 8 July 2011
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://commons.ln.edu.hk/sw_master/4492
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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Identification of auction models using order statistics, Identification of mixture models using support variations, Identification of first-price auctions with non-equilibrium beliefs: a measurement error approach, Are there common values in first-price auctions? A tail-index nonparametric test
Cites Work
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