A new binary relation to compare viability of winning coalitions and its interrelationships to desirability relation and blockability relation

DOI10.1016/j.amc.2010.12.101zbMath1208.91024OpenAlexW1964149748MaRDI QIDQ632840

Masahito Kitamura, Takehiro Inohara

Publication date: 28 March 2011

Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2010.12.101

zbMATH Keywords

game theorycoalitiongroup decision makingsimple gamedesirability relationblockability relation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Decision theory for games (91A35)

Related Items (2)

Collusion properties of coalition values for games in characteristic function form ⋮ Coalition analysis with preference uncertainty in group decision support

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• The desirability relation of simple games
• New interpretation of the core of simple games in terms of voters' permission.
• A method to compare influence of coalitions on group decision other than desirability relation
• A characterization of completeness of blockability relations with respect to unanimity
• Comparability of coalitions in committees with permission of voters by using desirability relation with hopefulness relation.
• Symmetry of simple games and permission of voters.

This page was built for publication: A new binary relation to compare viability of winning coalitions and its interrelationships to desirability relation and blockability relation